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Abstract
This study proposes a model that describes banks’ decisions about their capital structures
and analyzes the effects of regulating banks’ capital adequacy ratios (CAR); that is, the ratio
of equity financing to risky assets. This study investigates whether bank lending decreases
when the banks need to raise their CAR to satisfy the regulation. We analyze a model in
which households have bargaining power regarding deposits and a bank must adjust its capital
structure indirectly through the households’ decision-making, and compare the results which
that obtained in a model in which the bank has the bargaining power. In either case, the
bank can suffer a loss when it raises its CAR. However, changes in the amount of lending in
the two models differ. When the bank has the bargaining power, it always chooses to just use
equity financing more, and thus there is no probability that bank lending decreases. When the
households has the bargaining power, contrariwise, this model shows that the more risk-averse
households are, the more likely the amount of lending is to decrease. These results can explain
why banks’ reaction to the CAR regulation are different from each other. Moreover, the results
indicate a positive probability that regulating banks’ capital structures has a negative effect on
the economy.
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1 Introduction
After the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the danger of negative externalities that highly indebted
financial institutions face gained attention and some argue that financial institutions should have
more equity so that they can absorb shock. The new regulations on banks, Basel III, require banks to
have enough equity to satisfy the required capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Many studies analyze the
relationship between banks’ capital structure and financial stability, and most find that increasing
banks’ CAR contributes more or less to financial stability. However, there is no consensus on the cost
of the regulation; that is, whether or not the regulation decreases banks’ lending is still disputed.
This is because the models that prior studies use are not sufficient to investigate the regulations
on banks’ CAR. In order to analyze effects of the regulation, research must investigate the optimal
strategies for banks on not only its lending but also its financing. In other words, we need investigate
how banks mix deposit and equity financing and how the regulation affects banks’ decisions. However,
most models in the literature are not suited for such an investigation.
Recent analyses of financial policies use dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models.
Before the crisis, there was little attention on financial intermediaries, and few analyses adopted
DSGE-type models that include the financial intermediary sector. Then, after the crisis, new types
of DSGE models emerged in which banks (financial intermediaries) play the role of enhancing a shock.
However, these models do not consider banks’ equity financing and suppose that they accumulate
their retained earnings as their capital for tractability. Thus, it is not possible to investigate how
banks mix deposit and equity financing with these models.
Other models focus on analysis of banks’ decision making. Before the crisis, most of these analyses
were based on the traditional idea that deposit financing was optimal for banks. Then, the crisis
raised doubts about this idea and many studies constructed models to analyze merits of equity
financing. However, the problem in these analyses is that they do not consider the advantages of the
other financing means; in other words, banks can use both deposit and equity financing, but only
one of them is always superior. Then, without some restrictions, models in which deposit financing
is always optimal show that the optimal CAR for banks without regulations is 0, whereas models in
which equity financing is always optimal show that the optimal CAR is 1. Moreover, it is difficult to
compare these models in order to obtain general implications on the effects of regulations on banks’
CAR.
On the other hand, there are two important results in the existing literature. First, Lindquist
(2004) and Aiyar et al. (2015) point out that some banks held enough capital to satisfy the levels
in Basel III before the crisis. In addition, Berger et al. (2008) points out that the capital in these
banks is not retained earnings, but obtained by issuing new shares in the U.S. These results imply
that banks’ optimal CAR is neither 0 nor 1, and affected by the properties of the banks and the
economy. Hence, we need to investigate not only how banks determine their capital structures, but
also how they adjust them. Second, Kanngiesser et al. (2017) point out that some banks in the EU
decrease lending in order to increase their CARs. Ben Naceur et al. (2018) analyze data on bank
2
holding companies in the United States and Europe, and they show that capital regulations have
more significant and negative impacts on European banks than they do on U.S. banks. Therefore,
banks’ reactions to a CAR regulation are not uniformly determined, and it is possible that banks
decrease their lending under the regulation, although those who support regulations on banks’ CARs
argue1 that banks can increase their CARs by issuing new shares and the regulations do not decrease
banks’ lending. Thus, we need to investigate what causes some banks to decrease their lending to
satisfy the regulation whereas others issue new shares. Recently, it is pointed out that the effect
of capital regulations is nonlinear with respect to their capitalizations (Olszak et al., 2016), but we
analyze a nonlinear effect regarding to depositors’ properties.
In conclusion, this study investigates what leads banks to decrease their lending to raise their
CARs when they can issue new share for that purpose. We therefore analyze how a bank determines
and adjusts its capital structure using models in which it has an incentive to use both deposit
and equity financing; that is, the optimal CAR is likely to be neither 1 nor 0. In addition, we
investigate banks’ decisions, taking into account the interactions between banks and households
(banks’ depositors).
In our theoretical models, we suppose that the bank’s objective is to maximize its expected return
on equity (ROE),2 3 but it must keep the probability of bankruptcy under a fixed level in order to
attract depositors.4 Based on these suppositions, we investigate two types of models. The bank has
bargaining power regarding deposits in the first model, and the households (the bank’s depositors)
has the bargaining power in the second one.
The first model shows that the optimal CAR for the bank can be either an interior solution or
0. When the lower limit of the reserve ratio is sufficiently small or the parameter of the depositors’
demand for the bank’s soundness is sufficiently large, the bank uses both deposit and equity financing
and its CAR is an interior solution, otherwise the bank use only equity financing and its CAR is 0.
With regard to regulating CARs, we have two results using this model. First, there is a probability
that banks with a small CAR relative to the level of the new regulation will suffer a decrease in their
expected ROE. Second, there is no probability that these unsound banks decrease their lending to
satisfy the regulation, and thus regulating banks’ CARs never harms the economy.
In the second model, the households determine the amount of deposit, and thus the bank must
1Admati et al. (2014) summarizes supporters’ arguments for regulations on banks’ CARs and responses to the
opponents’ assertions.
2Bhattacharyya and Purnanandam (2011) points out that many banks determined rewards for their managers
based on their ROE before the crisis, and that this payment structure led to the banks’ risk-taking and made the
financial system more unstable.
3With regard to why banks are reluctant to issue new shares, some argue that debt financing (deposit financing)
is superior to equity financing in terms of reducing tax payments.
4As these suppositions indicate, the ratio of deposit financing to equity financing plays an important role in this
analysis, and the amount of these financing sources and total size of the bank’s balance sheet are indeterminate.
Although the heterogeneity of banks in response to the size of their balance sheets is an important issue, it is beyond
the scope of this study and we do not treat the issue.
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indirectly lead them to hold a higher share. Then, we obtain two new results when the households
are risk-averse. First, the optimal CAR is more like to be an interior solution than it is in the first
model, because they want hold deposits rather than shares. This result indicated that households’
demand is one of the factors that determine the amount of banks’ deposit financing, and this is
similar to the result of Van den Heuvel (2008). Second, there is a probability that unsound banks
decrease their lending to satisfy the regulation; that is, a CAR regulation can work as to slow down
economic activities when we consider the household’s decisions. These results imply that we should
pay more attention to the interaction between banks’ decisions and households’ demand and their
adjustment process.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3
presents the model in which the bank has bargaining power regarding deposits, and examines the
effects of CAR regulation. Section 4 presents the model in which the households have bargaining
power regarding deposits, and examines effects of the regulation. Section 5 presents our conclusion.
Proofs of the all lemmas, propositions, and corollaries are presented in the Appendix.
2 Review of literature
As Thakor (2014), theories about the effect of bank capital (equity financing) on the bank’s behaviors
are divided into three groups. The first group argues that banks should rely on deposit financing
and that high leverage is optimal for banks. It supposes that deposit financing is superior to equity
financing because banks can obtain rent via deposit financing. Thus, CAR regulation is not always
desirable for banks because it leads them to decrease their deposit financing. Various factors can be
the source of rent. For example, DeAngelo and Stulz (2015) argued that banks’ deposit financing
works as a provision of liquidity to households who cannot access the capital market and earns rent.
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) empirically showed that bank deposit have social values
as safe and liquid assets.
Theories in the second group also argue that banks should rely on deposit financing, though for a
different reason. Though theories in the first group are based on the merit of bank deposits, theories
in the second group emphasize that the bank deposit financing works as discipline on banks. When
a bank relies heavily on deposit financing, it is exposed to a high risk of bankruptcy. Thus, the bank
avoids taking too much risk in order to prevent depositors from withdrawing en masse. Based on this
idea, CAR regulation is not always desirable for either banks or the entire economy because it could
decrease banks’ deposit financing and leads banks to aggressive risk taking. This idea is based on
such studies as those by Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Calomiris and Kahn (1991), and theories
in this group represent a large part of the literature on banks’ behavior from the 1980’s to the early
half of the 2000’s.
Theories in the third group argue that banks should rely on equity financing. These theories
can be divided further into three subgroups according to why equity financing is desirable. Theories
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in the first subgroup regard equity financing as a means to make the bank’s objectives consistent
with those of stockholders, and restrains the bank’s asset substitution; that is, excessive risk-taking
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Keeley, 1990). Theories in the second subgroup emphasize that banks’
reliance on equity financing improves their ability to absorb shocks (Repullo, 2004; Coval and Thakor,
2005). Theories in the third subgroup argue that equity financing rather than deposit financing forces
discipline on banks because bank managers pay attention to their stockholders’ profit.
As the above shows, theories in these three groups shore some criteria for judging bank financing
methods. However, as Thakor (2014) pointed out, most of the models these theories use are incon-
sistent with each other. On the one hand, models in theories supporting deposit financing do not
consider any merits of equity financing, while models in theories supporting equity financing show
that deposit financing leads only to an increasing risk of bankruptcy. Thus, the optimal CAR in
these models is always either 1 or 0, unless there is a limitation on the amount of deposit or equity.
Because discussions on costs of CAR regulation after the crisis are based mainly on these models,
there is no consensus on the cost yet.
Recently, however, some models in which both deposit and equity financing have merits appeared,
and the models in this study belong to this group. For example, Acharya et al. (2016) supposed that
using deposit financing gives banks an incentive to monitor their borrowers, whereas using equity
financing prevents banks from taking excessive risk. Acharya and Thakor (2016) found that both
deposit and equity financing discipline banks, though how they do so differs. Chen (2016) argued
that banks can reduce the risk of bankruptcy by relying on equity financing, but the cost of equity
financing depends on the severity of the competition in the credit market, and thus pointed out that
deposit financing could be relatively desirable.
With respect to the effects of capital regulations, Carlson et al. (2013) test the hypothesis that
the association between capital regulations and growth of banks’ lending is nonlinear and provides
strong empirical support for that. Olszak et al. (2016) also shows that lending of poorly capitalized
banks is more affected by capital regulation than lending of well-capitalized banks. However, in the
theoretical literature, how changes in CAR restrictions affect banks’ capital structure, or whether
increasing a bank’s CAR leads it to decrease its lending is still not clear. Moreover, most prior studies
analyze banks’ behaviors based on relationship between banks and their borrowers (firms); that is,
from the perspective of bank lending. Thus, we here focus on the relationship between banks and
their depositors and investigate how the CAR affects banks’ capital structures and their lending.
3 Baseline Model
In this section, we develop a simple one-period (T = 0, 1) model with a bank and households, and
the bank determines the amount of deposit. The settings of the bank are based on Thakor (2014),
and we introduce the bank’s bankrupt as Allen et al. (2015). We then investigate how the bank
determines its capital structure and how regulations on its CAR affect its decisions using the model.
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3.1 Settings
Suppose that the economy has one bank and households. At T = 0, the bank collects fund by
receiving deposits from the households (deposit financing) and issuing shares (equity financing). The
total amount of funds that the bank can collect from households is fixed and denoted as G. In
addition, we denote the amount of funds collected using deposit financing as DB and that collected
using equity financing as EB (subscript B indicates that it the bank’s choice). Thus, G = DB + EB
is always satisfied.
After collecting G, the bank invests the funds in a risky project, and at T = 1, it receives the
return. We suppose that the bank holds some parts of G as reserves and does not invest it, and that
the amount of the reserves is determined by the amount of deposits DB. We denote the reserve as
sDB with the bank’s reserve ratio s. Thus, the bank’s investment amount, LB, is defined as
LB ≡ DB + EB − sDB = G− sDB.
The profit ratio r of the bank’s investment is a random variable and uniformly distributed on the
support [0, R] such that R > 2rd is satisfied. We denote the density function and the cumulative
distribution function of r as f(r) and F (r), respectively. In addition, we suppose that the profit ratio
of reserves is 1 and there exists a lower limit on s s, and denote it as s ∈ (0, 1).
At T = 1, the bank receives the return on its investment, and first repays to the depositors,
and then pays dividends to stockholders.We assume that the repayment to the depositors is the sum
of the principal and the interest and denote the repayment ratio as rd. Then, thus, the amount
of repayment to depositors is rdDB. The amount of funds that the bank can use for payment is
sDB+rLB, and thus, there is no dividend unless sDB+rLB > rdDB is satisfied. In other words, when
sDB+rLB < rdDB is satisfied, the return on the investment is not sufficient to even repay depositors,
and consequently, the bank goes bankrupt and its funds are distributed among the depositors equally.
There is a threshold rate r below which the bank goes bankrupt, and it is defined as
r =
(rd − s)DB
LB
.
The probability that the bank goes bankrupt is F (r). We assume that the bank must keep the
probability not more than γ ∈ [0, 1] in order to receive deposits from households. We interpret
this parameter γ as the depositors’ demand for the bank’s soundness. In addition, we suppose that
Rγ < 1 is satisfied, meaning that the threshold profit rate r is less than 1 when the bank is sound
enough to satisfy the constraint F (r) ≤ γ, γ ∈ [0, 1).5
We suppose that the bank tries to maximize its expected ROE, and define ROE as the dividend
per amount of equity financing. Based on the above suppositions, the bank has an incentive to be
reluctant to issue shares to keep its expected ROE high on the one hand, and it will be reluctant to
rely only on deposit financing to keep its probability of going bankrupt small on the other hand.
5The probability that a bank goes bankrupt is F (r) = r/R; thus, we denote the constraint on the probability as
r/R ≤ γ. By rewriting the expression, we have r ≤ Rγ, and thus have r < 1 when Rγ < 1 is satisfied.
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3.2 Analysis of Baseline Model: Optimal CAR
The maximization problem for the bank is
max
DB, EB, s
E[ROE] ≡
∫ R
r
1
EB
[
(DB + EB − sDB)r + sDB − rdDB
]
f(r)dr,
s.t. F (r) ≤ γ,
0 < s ≤ s ≤ 1.
We denote the ratio of deposit financing to total funding as d = DB/G, and denote the expected
ROE as RB(d, s), a function of d and s. Because F (r) is defined as r/R, we can rewrite the problem
above as follows.
max
d, s
RB(d, s) ≡
[
R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]2
2R(1− d)(1− sd)
(3.1)
s.t. d ≤
Rγ
(rd − s) +Rγ · s
≡ dγ(s) (3.2)
s ≤ s ≤ 1
Considering that the constraint F (r) ≤ γ, d = 0 must be satisfied when γ = 0, we suppose
γ ∈ (0, 1]. In addition, from equation (3.1), we assume that d 6= 1 and sd 6= 1 are satisfied.
Definition 1. Define the threshold value of d as
dˆ(s) ≡
2(rd − s)−R(1− s)
(R− 1)s2 − (R− rd + 1)s+ rd
.
Then, we have the following lemma on the RB(d, s) defined in equation (3.1).
Lemma 1. 1. The following relationship between RB(d, s) and s is satisfied.
(a) When d > 0, RB(d, s) is monotonically decreasing in s.
(b) When d = 0, RB(d, s) does not depends on s.
2. The following relationship between RB(d, s) and d holds, where dˆ(s) is the threshold value defined
as Definition 1 .
(a) When s <
R− 2rd
R− 2
, RB(d, s) is monotonically increasing in d.
(b) When
R− 2rd
R− 2
≤ s ≤
R− rd
R− 1
,
i. When d > dˆ(s), RB(d, s) is monotonically increasing in d.
ii. When d = dˆ(s), RB(d, s) depends on only s.
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iii. When d < dˆ(s), RB(d, s) is monotonically decreasing in d.
(c) When
R− rd
R− 1
< s, RB(d, s) is monotonically decreasing in d.
For the threshold value dˆ(s), we can rewrite equation dˆ(s) = 1 as
(R− 1)(1− s)
(
R− rd
R− 1
− s
)
= 0.
Thus, the curve d = dˆ(s) intersects with the line d = 1 at s = 1 and s = (R − rd)/(R − 1). In
addition, it intersects with the line d = 0 at s = (R− 2rd)/(R− 2). Then, the relationship between
s and d is shown in Figure 1, with some s < (R− 2rd)/(R− 2)
Figure 1: the relationship between s and d
As equation (3.2) shows, d = dγ(s) is monotonically increasing in s, and 0 < dγ(0) < dγ(1) < 1
holds. From Lemma 1.1 , the bank has an incentive to decrease s unless d = 0. In addition, from
Lemma 1.2 , a larger d is optimal when d > dˆ(s), whereas a smaller d is optimal when d < dˆ(s).
Thus, in Figure 1, the possible equilibria of the maximization problem is point A and the points on
segment BB1.
To investigate the equilibrium, we have the following definitions.
Definition 2. Define a bank’s CAR as
τB(s, d) ≡
EB
LB
=
1− d
1− sd
.
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Definition 3. Define the function γ˜(s) as
γ˜(s) ≡
2(rd − s)−R(1− s)
rd − s
.
The function γ˜(s) is the function to calculate the threshold value of γ, on which the bank’s optimal
choice of (d, s) depends.
We thus summarize the equilibrium of the maximization problem as follows.
Proposition 1. Denote the equilibrium of the maximization problem as (d∗, s∗), and denote the
bank’s expected ROE and CAR as R∗B ≡ RB(d
∗, s∗) and τ ∗B ≡ τB(d
∗, s∗), respectively. In addition,
define γ˜(s) as Definition 3. Then, (d∗, s∗), R∗B and τ
∗
B is determined as follows.
1. When s <
R− 2rd
R− 2
, γ > γ˜(s) always holds. Then, the equilibrium is (dγ(s), s); that is, point A
in Figure 1. In this case, express (d∗, s∗), R∗B, and τ
∗
B as
d∗ =
Rγ
(rd − s) +Rγ · s
, s∗ = s , R∗B =
R
2
·
(rd − s)(1− γ)
2
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
, τ ∗B =
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
rd − s
.
2. When
R− 2rd
R− 2
≤ s ≤
R− rd
R− 1
,
(a) When γ > γ˜(s), the equilibrium is (dγ(s), s), and (d
∗, s∗); R∗B and τ
∗
B are the same as the
first case in this proposition.
(b) When γ ≤ γ˜(s), the equilibrium is (0, s), and R∗B and τ
∗
B are the same as the third case in
this proposition.
3. When
R− rd
R− 1
< s, γ ≤ γ˜(s) always holds. Then, the equilibrium is (0, s); that is, as any point
on segment BB1. In this case, express (d
∗, s∗), R∗B, and τ
∗
B as
d∗ = 0 , ∀ s∗ ∈ [s, 1], R∗B =
R
2
, τ ∗B = 1 .
Thus, when the lower limit of the reserve ratio s is sufficiently small or the parameter of the
depositors’ demand for the bank’s soundness, γ, is sufficiently large, the bank uses both deposit and
equity financing, and the equilibrium is thus (dγ(s), s) and the optimal CAR is an interior solution.
On the other hand, when s is sufficiently large or γ is sufficiently small, it uses only equity financing,
and its CAR is thus 1.
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3.3 Analysis of Baseline Model: CAR Regulation
In this subsection, we analyze how regulating the bank’s CAR affects its capital structure. Suppose
that a new regulation requires the bank to keep its CAR below the mandatory level of τ ∈ (0, 1). In
other words, the bank must satisfy the new constraint on its CAR, τB(d, s) ≥ τ . By using Definition
2, we can rewrite the constraint as
d ≤
1− τ
1− sτ
≡ dτ (s) . (3.3)
As equation (3.3) shows, d = dτ (s) is monotonically increasing in s, and 0 < dτ (0) < dτ (1) = 1
holds. Thus, the function d = dτ (s) is as in Figure 2 with some τ , and the larger τ is, the lower the
curve d = dτ (s) is. As Figure 2 shows, the two curves d = dγ(s) and d = dτ (s) have one intersection
point within s < 1 as long as dγ(0) > dτ (0). When dγ(0) ≤ dτ (0), all of the equilibria described in
Proposition 1 satisfy the regulation. Therefore, we here suppose that the regulation level τ satisfies
dγ(0) > dτ (0).
Figure 2: the relationships between d, s, and CAR regulation
When d = 0 holds at the equilibrium, the bank’s CAR is 1, as in Proposition 1. Thus, the
new CAR regulation affects only the bank that chooses (dˆ(s), s); that is, point A, as optimal choice
without the regulation. In addition, Lemma 1 still holds when there is the new constraint d ≤ dτ (s),
and the possible equilibria under the new regulation are point A’ and the points on segment BB1 in
Figure 2.
In order to investigate the equilibrium with a regulation on the bank’s CAR, we have the following
definitions.
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Definition 4. Define the functions τ˜(s) as
τ˜(s) ≡
[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
rd − s
]2
. (3.4)
Definition 5. Define si, which satisfies dγ(si) = dτ (si), as
si ≡
Rγ − (1− τ)rd
Rγ − (1− τ)
.
si is positive and less than 1 as long as Rγ/rd > 1− τ ; in other words, τB(dγ(s), s) < τ .
We summarize the equilibrium of the maximization problem with a new regulation on the bank’s
CAR as follows.
Proposition 2. Suppose that a new regulation on banks’ CAR, τ(d, s) ≥ τ , is put into force and
τ(dγ(s, s)) < τ .
Denote the equilibrium of the maximization problem under the new regulation as (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ), and
denote the bank’s expected ROE and CAR under the regulation as R∗B,τ ≡ RB(d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ ) and τ
∗
B,τ ≡
τB(d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ ), respectively. In addition, define si as Definition 5, and suppose that s ≤ si.
Then, express (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ), R
∗
B,τ , and τ
∗
B,τ as follows, where τ˜(s) is defined as the expression (3.4) in
Definition 4.
1. When s <
R− 2rd
R− 2
, τ < τ˜(s) always holds. Then, the equilibrium is (dτ (s), s),
, and is point A’ in Figure 2. In this case, express (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ), R
∗
B,τ , and τ
∗
B,τ as
d∗τ =
1− τ
1− sτ
, s∗τ = s, R
∗
B,τ =
1
2Rτ
[
R− (1− τ)
rd − s
1− s
]2
, τ ∗B,τ = τ .
2. When
R− 2rd
R− 2
≤ s ≤ si,
(a) When τ < τ˜(s), the equilibrium is (dγ(s), s), and (d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ ), and R
∗
B,τ , and τ
∗
B,τ are the same
as in the first case in this proposition.
(b) When τ ≥ τ˜(s), the equilibrium is (0, s), and is any point on segment BB1. In this case,
express (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ), R
∗
B,τ , and τ
∗
B,τ as
d∗ = 0 , ∀ s∗ ∈ [s, 1], R∗B =
R
2
, τ ∗B = 1 .
When s satisfies si < s ≤ 1, the equilibrium is determined as in Proposition 1.
In addition, we have the following lemma on the expected ROE RB(dτ (s), s).
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Lemma 2. The expected ROE RB(dτ (s), s) has the following properties.
1. When τ 2 < τ˜(s), RB(dτ (s), s) is monotonically decreasing in τ .
2. When τ˜(s) < τ 2, RB(dτ (s), s) is monotonically increasing in τ .
Then, we have following result with regard to how regulating the bank’s CAR affects its capital
structure.
Corollary 1. Suppose that a bank chooses (dγ(s), s), but needs to increase its CAR to satisfy the
regulation τB ≥ τ . In addition, suppose that τ < 1. Then, the following results hold.
1. When s ≤
R− 2rd
R− 2
and d∗τ 6= 0, R
∗
B,τ < R
∗
B hold.
2. In order to increase its CAR, the bank always chooses to increase the amount of its shares and
does not decrease its lending.
Corollary 1 implies two important results from the model in terms of regulating CARs. First,
when the regulation exists and the lower limit of s is sufficiently small, banks with a small CAR
relative to the level of the new regulation suffer a decrease in their expected ROE. Second, there is
no probability that these unsound banks decrease their lending to satisfy the regulation. Thus, under
the suppositions in the model in this section, regulating banks’ CARs never harms the economy.
4 Model 2: Households have the bargaining power on de-
posits
In this section, we develop a model similar to the one in Section 2, except that the households
determine the amount of deposits rather than the bank in this case.
4.1 Settings
Suppose that the economy has one bank and households, and the total size of the households is
normalized to 1. Most of the settings here are the same as those in Section 2. Each household i is
homogeneous and is uniformly distributed on the support [0, 1]. At T = 0, the bank collects funds
D and E from the households using deposit financing and equity financing, respectively. Then, it
keeps sD as reserves and invests the remaining amount. Define the bank’s total funds as G, and
the bank’s investment is then L ≡ G − sD. At T = 1, the bank receives the return on investment,
and thereafter repays rdD to depositors, and uses the remaining profits, if any, to pay dividends to
stockholders. The bank’s objective is to maximize its expected ROE.
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In this section, we have new important assumptions on the bank’s financing. We suppose that
the households have all of the bargaining power as to the amount of deposits, and the bank cannot
determine how much funding it receives as deposits. Therefore, households’ demand for deposits
determines the amount of the bank’s deposit financing, D. Then, the constraint on the probability
of the bank’s bankruptcy affects not only the bank’s decision, but also those of the households.
4.2 Households
We suppose that the households’ objective is to maximize sum of the expected utilities of two term
of consumption. The household receives fixed wage income w at T = 0, and there is no additional
earning at T = 1. Thus, they need to invest some part of w as bank deposits and/or shares at T = 0
in order to gain the return at T = 1 for the consumption at T = 1.
Denote household i’s consumption at time T as Ci,T (T = 0, 1). In addition, denote the amount
of household i’s earning used for the investment in the assets as Qi, and denote the total profit ratio
of the investment as µi. We express the households’ utilities as the logarithm of the utility function.
Then, household i’s utility maximization problem is defined as follows, where ρi expresses the time
preference rate of household i.
max
ci,0, ci,1
ln(ci,0) + ρi ln(ci,1)
s.t. ci,0 = w −Qi
ci,i = Qiµi
From first order differentiation, we have
Qi =
W
1 + ρi
.
Although the amount of household i’s investment Qi is determined, the composition of the in-
vestment, that is, the amounts of deposit and shares are not determined. Taking into account that
household i’s utility is increasing in the total profit ratio of the investment µi, we assume that it
choose the amounts of deposit and shares that maximize µi. Because the value of Qi does not depend
on µi, we can consider the maximization problem for µi separately from the above one.
Denote the ratio of household i’s expenditure for the bank deposit to the total investment; that
is, household i’s deposits-to-total-assets ratio, as di. Because the households are homogeneous, all
will choose the same ratio, and we thus treat all households as one household and omit the subscript
i. Denote the total amounts of the household’s deposits and investments as DH and QH and the total
profit ratio of the investment as µH(= µi), respectively. Then, the household’s deposits-to-total-assets
ratio dH is defined as dH ≡ DH/QH.
As it is mentioned above, the household determines the amount of deposit D in the model. In
other words, the amount of bank’s deposit financingD is always equal toDH. In addition, households’
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investment determine the total amount of the bank’s funding; that is, G is always equal to QH. Thus,
we can rewrite the ratio of the bank’s deposit financing to total funds, D/G as dH.
Suppose that the household chooses dH to maximize the profit ratio of the total investment, µH,
taking the risk of the bank’s shares into account. Then, in order to define µH, we need to calculate
the expected profit rates of bank deposits and shares. We denote the expected profit rate of deposits
as pid, and then define pid as
pid ≡
1
DH
[∫ R
r
(rdDH)f(r)dr +
∫ r
0
(rL+ sDH)f(r)dr
]
.
Considering that we can rewrite L as QH − sDH, we can rewrite the expression above as
pid ≡ rd −
(rd − s)
2
2R
·
dH
1− sdH
. (4.1)
Next, denote the expected profit rate as piE. Because piE is E[ROE], we express piE as
piE ≡
[
R(1− sdH)− (rd − s)dH
]2
2R(1− dH)(1− sdH)
. (4.2)
Using pid and piE, we define the profit ratio µH as dHpid + (1 − dH)piE. Then, as it is mentioned
above, we suppose that the household tries to maximize the profit ratio of its portfolio considering
the risk of the bank’s shares. Then, the objective function is[
dHpid + (1− dH)piE
]
−
1
2
λHσ
2
E(1− dH)
2,
where λH is the parameter of the household’s risk aversion, and σ
2
E is the variance of the dividend
on the bank’s shares.
As it is mentioned before, the household takes into account equation (3.2) as the constraint.
Thus, the household’s portfolio optimization problem is defined as follows.
max
dH
dHpid + (1− dH)piE −
1
2
λHσ
2
E(1− dH)
2
s.t. dH ≤ dγ(s)
0 ≤ dH ≤ 1
In addition, by substituting equation (4.1) and (4.2) into the objective function, we can rewrite
the above problem as
max
dH
1
2
[
R− (R− 2)sdH − λHσ
2
E(1− dH)
2
]
(4.3)
s.t. dH ≤ dγ(s)
0 ≤ dH ≤ 1
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By differentiating equation (4.3) by dH, we have
∂µ
∂dH
≥ 0 ⇔ 1−
(R− 2)s
2λHσ2E
≡ dµ(s) ≥ dH. (4.4)
Thus, based on equations (3.2) and (4.4), the relationship between dH and s is as in Figure 3 and
Figure 4. Denote the intersection point of the two curves d = dγ(s) and d = dτ (s) as point J, and
denote the value of the s-coordinate at point J as sj. In addition, denote the intersection point of
line d = dµ(s) and s-axis as point B, and denote the value of the s-coordinate at point B as sB.
Figure 3: the relationship between s and d (sj < 1) Figure 4: the relationship between s and d (1 ≤ sj)
From equation (4.4), with some s, the optimal value of d is fixed at dµ(s). When sj < 1 holds,
as in Figure 3, dH = dγ(s) is satisfied with ∀s ∈ [s, sj], whereas dH = dµ(s) is satisfied with ∀s ∈
[sj,min{sB, 1}], and d = 0 is satisfied with [sB, 1] when sB < 1. On the other hand, when sj satisfies
1 ≤ sj as in Figure 4, dH = dγ(s) always holds.
4.3 Bank
In the model in this section, the bank tries to maximize its expected ROE. Although the objective
function is the same as in equation (3.1), the ratio of the bank’s deposit financing d is always equal
to the household’s deposits-to-total-assets ratio dH, and thus the bank chooses only its reserve ratio
s.
4.4 Analysis of Model 2: Optimal CAR
Denote the intersection point of d = dµ(s) and d = dγ(s) as Point J and its value of s-coordinate as
sj. In this study, we suppose that s is so small that s < sj always holds.
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First, suppose that 1 ≤ sj holds, as in Figure 4, and dH = dγ(s) always holds. Considering that
RB(d, s) is decreasing in s as long as d 6= 0, the possible equilibrium is (dγ(s), s).
Next, suppose that sj < 1 holds, as in Figure 3. Then, the bank’s maximization problem is
max
s
RB(dH, s) ≡
[
R(1− sdH)− (rd − s)dH
]2
2R(1− dH)(1− sdH)
(4.5)
s.t. dH =
Rγ
(rd − s) +Rγ · s
≡ dγ(s) (when s ≤ sj is satisfied)
dH = 1−
(R− 2)s
2λHσ2E
≡ dµ(s) (when s > sj is satisfied)
s ≤ s ≤ 1
Because the expected ROE as defined in equation (4.5) is the same as in equation (3.1), the
properties of ∂RB(dH, s)/∂dH, and ∂RB(dH, s)/∂s are the same as in Lemma 1. Then, the above
maximization problem is described as in Figure 5 and Figure 6. In Figure 6, point C expresses the
intersection of the two lines d = dµ(s) and s = 1.
Figure 5: the relationship between d and s (sB <
1)
Figure 6: the relationship between d and s (sB ≥
1)
As it is mentioned above, the household’s choice of d is either dγ(s) or dµ(s), or 0 when dµ(s) is
negative. Thus, there are four possible equilibria: (dµ(s), s), (dγ(s), s), (0, sB), and (dµ(1), 1). The
latter three are points A, B, and C in Figure 5 and Figure 6, respectively.6
In order to summarize the properties of the equilibrium, we have the following two definitions.
6Point (dµ(s), s) exists when s is sufficiently large and point J is located in the upper left of the curve d = dˆ(s). In
other words, (dµ(s), s) can be the equilibrium when dγ(s) cannot be chosen because dµ(s) < dγ(s) holds.
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Definition 6. Define the value γ¨s as
γ¨s ≡
(rd − s)
[
2λHσ
2
E − (R− 1)s
]
R
[
2(1− s)λHσ2E + (R− 1)s
2
] ,
where Rγ¨s/
[
(rd − s)−Rγ¨ss
]
= 1− (R− 1)s/
[
2λHσE
]
holds.
Definition 7. Define the solutions to the equation below as γ
1
and γ
2
(γ
1
≤ γ
2
), respectively.
γ2 +
R(1− s)Γ− 2(rd − s)
rd − s
γ + (1− Γ) = 0
where Γ ≡
{
1−
(rd − 1)
[
2λHσ
2
E − (R− 1)
]
R(R− 1)
}2
We have following definitions as the possible equilibria.
Definition 8. Denote the equilibrium as (d∗H, s
∗
H), and the bank’s expected ROE and CAR at the
equilibrium as (d∗H, s
∗
H), R
∗
H ≡ RB(d
∗
H, s
∗
H) and τ
∗
H ≡ τB(d
∗
H, s
∗
H), respectively, where RB(d, s) and τB(d, s)
are defined as in expressions (4.5) and Definition 2.
Then, we have the following definitions.
1. Equilibrium A1 is (d
∗
H, s
∗
H) = (dγ(s), s). Then, Equilibrium A1, the bank’s expected ROE and
CAR in this case are expressed as
d∗H =
Rγ
(rd − s) +Rγ · s
, s∗H = s, R
∗
H =
R
2
·
(rd − s)(1− γ)
2
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
, τ ∗H =
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
rd − s
.
2. Equilibrium A2 is (d
∗
H, s
∗
H) = (dµ(s), s). Then, Equilibrium A2, the bank’s expected ROE and
CAR in this case are expressed as
d∗H = 1−
R− 2
2λHσ2E
s , s∗H = s, R
∗
H =
R
2
·
(rd − s)(1− γ¨s)
2
(rd − s)−Rγ¨s(1− s)
, τ ∗H =
(rd − s)−Rγ¨s(1− s)
rd − s
,
where γ¨s ≡
(rd − s)
[
2λHσ
2
E − (R− 1)s
]
R
[
2(1− s)λHσ2E + (R− 1)s
2
] .
3. Equilibrium B is (d∗H, s
∗
H) = (0, sB). Then, Equilibrium B, the bank’s expected ROE and CAR
in this case are expressed as
d∗H = 0, s
∗
H =
2λHσ
2
E
R− 2
, R∗H =
R
2
, τ ∗H = 1.
4. Equilibrium C is (d∗H, s
∗
H) = (dµ(1), 1). Then, Equilibrium C, the bank’s expected ROE and
CAR in this case are expressed as
d∗H = 1−
R− 2
2λHσ2E
, s∗H = 1, R
∗
H =
1
2R
[
R− (rd − 1)
2λHσ
2
E − (R− 2)
R− 2
]2
, τ ∗H = 1 .
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Then, we summarize the properties of the equilibrium of the bank’s maximization problem as
follows.
Proposition 3. Define γ˜(s) as Definition 3, γ¨s as Definition 6, γ1 and γ2 as Definition 7, and
Equilibrium A1, Equilibrium A2, Equilibrium B, and Equilibrium C as Definition 8, respectively. In
addition, suppose that s < sj < 1 holds.
7
Then, the equilibrium of the bank’s maximization problem, and the bank’s expected ROE and CAR
at the equilibrium, are determined as follows.
1. When λH ≤ (R− 2)/(2σ
2
E), and
(a) When γ˜(s) < γ ≤ γ¨(s) holds, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A1, defined as in Definition
8.1.
(b) When γ˜(s) < γ¨(s) < γ holds, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A2, defined as in Definition
8.2.
(c) when min{γ, γ¨(s)} ≤ γ˜(s) holds, the equilibrium is Equilibrium B, defined as in Definition
8.3.
2. When λH > (R− 2)/(2σ
2
E), and
(a) when s >
R− rd
R− 1
, 0 < γ
1
< 1 < γ
2
holds. Then,
i. when both γ ≤ γ¨(s) and γ < γ
1
hold, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A1, defined as in
Definition 8.1.
ii. when both γ¨(s) < γ and γ¨(s) < γ
1
hold, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A2, defined as
in Definition 8.2.
iii. when γ
1
< min{γ, γ¨(s)} holds, the equilibrium is Equilibrium C, defined as in Defini-
tion 8.4.
(b) when s ≤
R− rd
R− 1
holds and γ
1
and γ
2
satisfy 0 ≤ γ
1
< γ
2
≤ 1, then,
i. when γ ≤ γ¨(s) holds and γ satisfies either 0 ≤ γ < γ
1
or γ
2
< γ ≤ 1, the equilibrium
is Equilibrium A1, defined as in Definition 8.1.
ii. when γ¨(s) < γ holds and γ¨(s) satisfies either 0 ≤ γ¨(s) < γ
1
or γ
2
< γ¨(s) ≤ 1, the
equilibrium is Equilibrium A2, defined as in Definition 8.2.
iii. when γ
1
< min{γ, γ¨(s)} < γ
2
holds, the equilibrium is Equilibrium C, defined as in
Definition 8.4.
(c) when s ≤
R− rd
R− 1
holds and γ
1
and γ
2
does not exist as real solutions,
i. when γ ≤ γ¨(s), the equilibrium is Equilibrium A1, defined as in Definition 8.1.
7This supposition guarantees that dµ(s) < dγ(s) holds and that point B or C can be the equilibrium.
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ii. when γ¨(s) < γ, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A2, defined as in Definition 8.2.
In this section, d is determined by both the bank and the household, and thus, in order to obtain
the optimal level of d, the bank must adjust s and lead the household to choose the level. Then, the
response of dH to the change in s is mostly determined by λH; that is, the slope of line d = dµ(s), and
thus the level of λH affects how the results differ from those obtained in the model in the previous
section.
When λH is sufficiently small; that is, the slope of the line d = dµ(s) is sufficiently large, there is
a probability that the household will choose not dγ(s), but dµ(s). Then, the possible equilibrium is
(dµ(s), s) and the value at which the bank compares to γ˜(s) is not γ, but γ¨(s). Therefore, with the
parameters at which the equilibrium is d∗ 6= 0 in the model in the previous section, d∗ = 0 can be
satisfied in the equilibrium in this section.
When λH is sufficiently large, there are two important changes. First, there can be a new possible
equilibrium (dµ(1), 1); that is, point C, where the bank uses both deposit and equity financing, and
its CAR is 1.
Second, when point C exists with dµ(s) > 0, the bank’s CAR at the equilibrium is more likely
to satisfy 0 < τ ∗H < 1. In other words, the equilibrium (d
∗
H, s
∗
H) is more likely to satisfy d
∗
H > 0
and s∗H = s. As we showed, when λH is sufficiently small, the threshold that determines whether
d∗H > 0 holds or not is γ˜(s), and thus the process of determination of the equilibrium is not so largely
different from that in the model in the previous section. On the other hand, when λH is sufficiently
large and point C exists and dµ(1) > 0, d
∗
H > 0 holds, not only with sufficiently large γ and γ¨(s),
but also sufficiently small ones. When point C exists with dµ(1) > 0, the household is so heavily
risk-averse that it still demands the bank’s deposit with s = 1. In other words, the bank always
obtains d > 0 with ∀s ∈ [s, 1]. Then, when γ is sufficiently small, the bank can obtain a small d by
choosing s. Because it cannot obtain d = 0, and with some d 6= 0, the smaller s is, the more optimal
it is for the bank. Thus, when λH is sufficiently large and point C exists with dµ(1) > 0, s
∗
H = s with
sufficiently small γ and γ¨(s), the bank’s CAR at the equilibrium is more likely to satisfy 0 < τ ∗H < 1.
4.5 Analysis of Model 2: CAR Regulation
In this subsection, we analyze how regulating the bank’s CAR affects its capital structure. Again,
suppose that a new regulation is put into force and the bank’ CAR, τB, needs to satisfy τB ≥ τ .
Thus, as in the previous section, we add equation (3.3) as a constraint to the bank’s maximization
problem. Then, we describe the relationship between d and s as in Figure 7 and Figure 8 when τ is
sufficiently small. In these figures, points A” and J express the intersections of the curve d = dτ (s)
with line d = dµ(s) and with curve d = dγ(s), respectively, and the values of the s-coordinates at
these points are sµ and si, respectively. In addition, point I expresses the intersection of the two
curves d = dτ (s) and d = dγ(s), and si denotes the value of the s-coordinate at point I. Moreover,
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the new regulation affects only the bank that chooses (dγ(s), s)) or (dµ(s), s); that is, Equilibrium
A1 or Equilibrium A2, defined as in Definition 8.
Figure 7: the relationships between d and s (sB <
1)
Figure 8: the relationships between d and s (1 ≤
sB)
The CAR regulation does not affect the household, and thus their choice of d is either d(γs),
dµ(s), or 0 when dµ(s) is negative. Thus, there are four possible equilibria: (dµ(sµ), sµ), (dγ(si), si),
(0, sB), and (dµ(1), 1), which we describe as points A
′′, J , B, and C in Figure 7 and Figure 8.
To summarize the properties of the equilibrium, we have the following definition.
Definition 9. Define the solutions to the equation below as τ 1(s) and τ 2(s) (τ 1(s) ≤ τ 2(s)), respec-
tively.
(1− τ)2+
R(1− s)
[
R(1− s)Γ− 2(rd − s)
]
(rd − s)2
(1− τ) +
R2(1− s)2(1− Γ)
(rd − s)2
= 0
where Γ ≡
{
1−
(rd − 1)
[
2λHσ
2
E − (R− 1)
]
R(R− 1)
}2
In addition, we have the following definitions as the new possible equilibria.
Definition 10. Denote the equilibrium under the regulation τB(d, s) ≥ τ as (d
∗
H,τ , s
∗
H,τ ), and define the
bank’s expected ROE and CAR at the equilibrium as R∗H,τ ≡ RB(d
∗
H,τ , s
∗
H,τ ) and τ
∗
H,τ ≡ τB(d
∗
H,τ , s
∗
H,τ ),
respectively.
Then, we have following definitions.
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1. Equilibrium A” is (d∗H,τ , s
∗
H,τ ) = (dµ(sµ), sµ). The equilibrium at which the bank’s expected ROE
and CAR in this case are expressed as in
d∗H,τ =
1− τ
1− sµτ
, s∗H,τ = sµ ≡
(R− 2) + 2λHσ
2
E τ −
√
(R− 2 + 2λHσ2E τ)
2 − 8(R− 2)λHσ2E τ
2
2(R− 2)τ
,
R∗H,τ =
1
2Rτ
[
R− (1− τ)
rd − sµ
1− sµ
]2
, τ ∗H,τ = τ .
2. Equilibrium I is (d∗H,τ , sµ) = (dτ (si), si). The equilibrium at which the bank’s expected ROE and
CAR in this case are expressed as in
d∗H,τ =
Rγ − (1− τ)
Rγ − (1− rdτ)
, s∗H,τ = si ≡
Rγ − (1− τ)rd
Rγ − (1− τ)
, R∗H,τ =
(1− γ)2
τ
, τ ∗H,τ = τ .
We summarize the equilibrium under the new regulation as follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that a new regulation on banks’ CARs, τ(d, s) ≥ τ , is put into force and
τ(dγ(s, s)) < τ holds. In addition, suppose that sj < 1. Define τ˜(s) as in Definition 4, τ 1(s) and
τ 2(s) as Definition 9, Equilibrium B and Equilibrium C as Definition 8, and Equilibrium A
′′ and
Equilibrium I as Definition 10.
Then, the equilibrium under the new regulation at which the bank’s expected ROE and CAR in
this case are expressed as follows.
1. When λH ≤ (R− 2)/(2σ
2
E), and
(a) when both si < sµ and τ < τ˜(si) hold, the equilibrium is Equilibrium I, defined as in
Definition 10.2.
(b) when both si ≥ sµ and τ < τ˜(sµ) hold, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A
′′, defined as in
Definition 10.1.
(c) when τ ≥ τ˜(s¯) holds with s¯ ≡ min{si, sµ}, the equilibrium is Equilibrium B, defined as in
Definition 8.3.
2. When λH > (R− 2)/(2σ
2
E) holds, and
(a) when τ 1(s¯) and τ 2(s¯) do not exist as real solutions with s¯ ≡ min{si, sµ}, and
i. when si < sµ, the equilibrium is Equilibrium I, defined as in Definition 10.2.
ii. when si ≥ sµ, the equilibrium is Equilibrium A
′′, defined as in Definition 10.1.
(b) when τ 1(s¯) and τ 2(s¯) satisfy 0 ≤ τ 1(s¯) < τ 2(s¯) ≤ 1 with s¯ ≡ min{si, sµ}, and
i. when si < sµ, and τ satisfies either 0 ≤ τ < τ 1(si) or τ 2(si) < τ ≤ 1, the equilibrium
is Equilibrium I, defined as in Definition 10.2.
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ii. when si ≥ sµ, and τ satisfies either 0 ≤ τ < τ 1(sµ) or τ 2(sµ) < τ ≤ 1, the equilibrium
is Equilibrium A′′, defined as in Definition 10.1.
iii. when τ satisfies τ 1(s¯) < τ < τ 2(s¯) with s¯ ≡ min{si, sµ}, the equilibrium is Equilibrium
C, defined as in Definition 8.4.
In this section, d is determined by not the bank, but the household, and thus the bank must
increase s when it adjusts its capital structure in order to increase its CAR. In other words, the bank
cannot choose s under the regulation. Then, as in the previous subsection, the level of λH affects
how the results differ from those obtained in the model in the previous section.
When λH is sufficiently small, the possible equilibrium (dµ(smu), sµ) is relatively close to the point
at which (dτ (s), s), and thus the process of determining the equilibrium is not so largely different
from that in the model in the previous section.
When λH is sufficiently large and point C exists with dµ(1) > 0, on the other hand, both d
∗
H,τ > 0
and s∗H,τ < 1 hold at the equilibrium, not only with a sufficiently large τ , but also with a sufficiently
small τ . In other words, the bank’s CAR at the equilibrium is more likely to satisfy 0 < τ ∗H < 1, as
in the previous subsection.
In addition, the outcome of the regulation also changes due to the model’s property that s
increases when the bank adjusts its CAR. Then, we have following result as to how regulating banks’
CARs affects their capital structures.
Corollary 2. Suppose that the bank chooses s and the household chooses dγ(s), but the bank needs to
increase its CAR to satisfy the new regulation τB ≥ τ . In addition, suppose that τ < 1 holds. Then,
we obtain the following results.
1. When s ≤
R− 2rd
R− 2
and min{si, sµ} < (R− rd)/(R− 1), R
∗
H,τ < R
∗
B holds.
2. Suppose that 0 < d∗τ (s). Then, when the bank need to increase its CAR, there is a probability
that the amount of its lending decreases, as long as at least one of the following conditions
holds.
(a) dγ(s) is sufficiently small.
(b) λH is sufficiently large.
The result of Corollary 2.1 implies that when the bank uses both deposit and equity financing
under the regulation and its reserve ratio is not so large, its expected ROE decreases compared to
the case with no regulation. In other words, there is still a probability that banks with low CARs
relative to the mandatory level suffer a decrease in their expected ROEs, as in Corollary 1.
From Corollary 2.2, we derive two important implications. First, there is a probability that a
CAR regulation reduces bank lending and works so as to slow down economic activities when we
consider the household’s decisions. Second, how a bank reacts to a CAR regulation depends on its
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depositors’ properties. When the depositors are so risk-averse and they prefer holding deposits so
much to holding shares, the bank’s lending is likely to decrease. In other words, not only banks’
capitalization ratios but also degrees of households’ risk-aversion may cause differences in the capital
regulation’s effect among banks.
We derive the result of Corollary 2.2 as follows. As we described in the proof of Corollary 2, the
bank’s lending depends on the value of ds, and in order to keep the amount from decreasing, (d∗τ , s
∗
τ )
must satisfy dγ(s)s ≤ d
∗
τs
∗
τ .
Figure 9: the case in which dH increases under a regulation
Suppose that (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ) = (dµ(sµ), sµ) holds, as in Figure 9. Then, we can rewrite the inequality
dγ(s)s ≤ d
∗
τs
∗
τ as
dγ(s)s ≤ dµ(sµ)sµ ⇔
dγ(s)
sµ
≤
dµ(sµ)
s
,
⇔ tan(∠MOS2) ≤ tan(∠NOS1) .
Then, with some s and τ , the smaller dγ(s) is, the smaller tan(∠MOS2) is, and the larger λH is, the
larger dµ(sµ) becomes, and the larger tan(∠NOS1) is. Thus, the condition dγ(s)s ≤ d
∗
τs
∗
τ can be
likely to be satisfied. In other words, the bank’s lending is likely to decrease under the regulation
when dγ(s) is sufficiently small or λH is sufficiently large. Then, we have the result of Corollary 2.2,
which implies that there is a probability that a CAR regulation works as to slow down economic
activities when we consider the household’s decisions.
5 Conclusion
We summarize the analytical results as follows. First, the analysis shows that the bank uses both
deposit and equity financing, and the bank’s CAR can be neither 1 nor 0 when it has an incentive
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to use deposit financing, but the constraint on the probability of the bank’s bankruptcy prevents it
from depending on it heavily. In addition, we show that the probability that its CAR is an interior
solution is higher when the households have the bargaining power regarding deposits than that when
the bank has the bargaining power.
Suppose that the households have a high demand for the bank to be sound enough not to go
bankrupt. When the bank has the bargaining power, it decides not to use deposit financing and uses
only equity financing, and its CAR is 1. On the other hand, when the households have the bargaining
power and they are so heavily risk-averse that they always demand deposits, the bank can neither
use deposit financing heavily nor stop using it. In this situation, there is a probability that the bank
receives some deposits and holds some reserves and its CAR is neither 1 nor 0. In other words, when
the households determine the amount of deposits and their demand for it is sufficiently high, the
bank’s CAR is more likely to be an interior solution.
Second, the analysis shows that banks’ expected ROE can decrease under the CAR regulation.
Suppose that a regulation on banks’ CARs is put into force and a bank’s CAR is neither 0 nor 1,
both before and after the regulation enters into force. When the bank’s reserve ratio is sufficiently
small before the regulation and not so large after the regulation, the bank’s expected ROE under the
regulation is less than it obtained before the regulation, regardless of whether the households have
the bargaining power on deposits. In other words, unsound banks may suffer a loss under a CAR
regulation.
Third, the results show that regulating banks’ CARs leads to a decrease in banks’ lending when
households’ decision-making is taken into account. Thus, it implies that not only the banks’ capi-
talization ratios but also their depositors’ properties cause differences in regulation’s effects among
banks. When the households have the bargaining power on deposits, there is a probability that banks’
lending will decrease under the regulation. Suppose that a regulation on banks’ CARs is put into
force and a bank needs to increase its CAR. When the bank has the bargaining power on deposits,
it can adjust its capital structure directly to satisfy the regulation, and it thus chooses to use only
more equity financing. Then, there is no probability that banks will decrease their lending under the
regulation, as supporters of CAR regulation argue. When the households have the bargaining power
on deposits, on the other hand, the bank must change its reserve ratio and indirectly lead households
to hold a higher share, and thus the amount of the bank’s reserve can increase under the regulation.
In addition, an increase in the households’ expenditure on the bank’s shares means a decrease in the
bank’s deposits. Thus, when the households determine the amount of deposits and their demand for
deposits is sufficiently high, the bank must increase its reserve ratio considerably in order to satisfy
the regulation. Therefore, there is a probability that the bank’s lending will decrease under the CAR
regulation.
These results imply that we should pay more attention to the interaction between banks’ decisions
and households’ demand and their adjustment process.
However, the results in this study depend on some specific suppositions, especially the model’s
feature that households’ demand works as a constraint based on the assumption that the households’
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total expenditure on assets is always equal to the amount of the bank’s funding. This supposition
means that the only assets in the economy are offered by the bank, but this is not the case in the
actual economy. An analysis that includes more assets, such as government bonds, is future research
theme.
In addition, we consider that the merit of a bank’s equity financing is to maintain a lower probabil-
ity of bankruptcy. However, as we mentioned in Section 2, restraining the bank’s excessive risk-taking
is also a merit of equity financing, and recently there is increasing research in this direction. Thus,
future studies should introduce firms into the model and analyze the effect of a CAR regulation on
banks’ capital structures in more detail.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
First, we consider the bank’s choice of s. When d = 0, we have RB(0, s) = R/2 and the expected
ROE does not depend on s, and thus we assume that d > 0.
By differentiating RB(0, s) defined in (3.1) by s, we have
∂RB(d, s)
∂s
=
1
2R(1− d)
{
2
[
R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]
1− sd
(−Rd+ d) +
[
R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]2
(1− sd)2
d
}
,
=
d
[
R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]
2R(1− d)(1− sd)2
[
−2(R− 1)(1− sd) +R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]
,
=
d
[
R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]
2R(1− d)(1− sd)2
[
−(R− 2)(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]
.
Because 1 > sd and rd > s hold, the sign of the value in the large square braces is negative. Then,
the sign of ∂RB(d, s)/∂s is negative when the sign of
[
R(1− sd)− (rd − s)d
]
is positive.
Suppose that [R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d] ≤ 0 holds with some fixed value, s¯ ∈ [s, 1]. Then, we have
R
Rs¯+ (rd − s¯)
≤ d .
The left part of the inequality is decreasing in s¯ and the smallest value is R/(R+rd−1). Thus, when[
R(1− sd)− (rd− s)d
]
≤ 0 holds, d must satisfies R/(R+ rd− 1) < d. On the other hand, the bank
must chooses d such that satisfies the constraint d ≤ dγ(s) ≡ Rγ/(Rγs + rd − s). Because Rγ < 1
holds by the assumption, dγ(s) is increasing in s and the largest value is Rγ/(Rγ + rd − 1) that is
smaller than R/(R + rd − 1). Thus, the bank chooses d such that satisfies d < R/(R + rd − 1) and[
R(1 − sd) − (rd − s)d
]
> 0 holds. Therefore, the sign of ∂RB(d, s)/∂s is negative and the optimal
value of s is the smallest one; that is, s.
Next, we consider the bank’s choice of d. Suppose that its reserve ratio is some fixed value,
s¯ ∈ [s, 1]. By differentiating RB(d, s¯) by d, we have
∂RB(d, s¯)
∂d
=
2
[
R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d
]
2R(1− d)(1− s¯d)
[
−Rs¯− (rd − s¯)
]
−
[
R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d
]2
2R[(1− d)(1− s¯d)]2
[
2s¯d− (1 + s¯)
]
,
=
R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d
2R[(1− d)(1− s¯d)]2
{
−2(Rs¯+ rd − s¯)(1− d)(1− s¯d)
+
[
R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d
][
(1− s¯d) + s¯(1− d)
]}
,
=
R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d
2R[(1− d)(1− s¯d)]2
{
R(1− s¯d)2 − s¯R(1− d)(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)
[
(1− d) + (1− s¯d)
]}
,
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=
R(1− s¯d)− (rd − s¯)d
2R[(1− d)(1− s¯d)]2
{
(1− s¯d)
[
R(1− s¯)− (rd − s¯)
]
− (rd − s¯)(1− d)
}
.
As it is described above, R(1 − s¯d) − (rd − s¯)d > 0 holds when the constraint d ≤ dγ(s¯) holds, and
thus the sign of ∂RB(d, s¯)/∂d depends on the sign of the value in the large braces.
By rearranging (1− s¯d)
[
R(1− s¯)− (rd − s¯)
]
− (rd − s¯)(1− d), we define J (s) as
J (d) ≡ (rd − s¯)
{[
R(1− s¯)
rd − s¯
− 1
]
(1− s¯d)− (1− d)
}
.
First, suppose that (R − rd)/(R − 1) < s¯ holds. Then, we have R(1 − s¯)/(rd − s¯) < 1. Because
both (1 − s¯d) and (1 − d) are nonnegative with ∀d ∈ [0, 1], we have J (d) < 0. Next, suppose that
(R − 2rd)/(R − 2) > s¯ holds. Then, we have R(1 − s¯)/(rd − s¯) − 1 > 1. The both first and second
terms in the large braces of J (d) are the linear functions of d, and J (d) > 0 holds with both d = 0
and d = 1. Thus, in this case, J (d) > 0 holds with ∀d ∈ [0, 1].
Lastly, suppose that (R − 2rd)/(R − 2) ≤ s¯ ≤ (R − rd)/(R − 1) holds. Then, the first term
is always nonnegative but smaller than or equal to 1 with d = 0. Thus, with some dˆ(s¯) ∈ [0, 1],
J (dˆ(s¯)) = 0 is satisfied, and then J (d) < 0 holds with d < dˆ(s¯), and J (d) > 0 holds with d > dˆ(s¯),
respectively. By rearranging J (dˆ(s¯)) = 0, dˆ(s) is defied as
dˆ(s) ≡
2(rd − s)−R(1− s)
(R− 1)s2 − (R− rd + 1)s+ rd
.
Then, because the sign of ∂RB(d, s¯)/∂d is the same as that of J (d), we have the result of Lemma
1.
6.2 Proof of Proposition 1
When the bank chooses d = 0, the expected ROE is RB(0, s) = R/2. Then the bank’s choice of s
does not affect the expected ROE, and thus, ∀s ∈ [s, 1] is optimal.
Suppose that the bank chooses d 6= 0. Because RB(d, s) is decreasing in s as long as d 6= 0 is
satisfied, the bank chooses s. When s satisfies (R − 2rd)/(R − 2) ≤ s ≤ (R − rd)/(R − 1), R(d, s)
can be either increasing or decreasing in d. With
(
dγ(s), s
)
, the bank’s expected ROE is calculated
as
RB(dγ(s), s) =
R
2
·
(rd − s)(1− γ)
2
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
.
Because R(0, s) = R/2, the inequality R(0, s) < RB(dγ(s), s) can be rewritten as
R
2
<
R
2
·
(rd − s)(1− γ)
2
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
⇔ 0 < (rd − s)γ
[
γ −
2(rd − s)−R(1− s)
rd − s
]
.
Then, because s < 1 < rd holds, the condition is summarized as
2(rd − s)−R(1− s)
rd − s
≡ γ˜(s) < γ .
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and thus γ˜(s) < γ holds when (dγ(s), s) is the equilibrium, otherwise (0, s¯), s¯ ∈ [s, 1] is the equilib-
rium.
By rewriting inequality γ˜(s) < 0, we have
2−
R(1− s)
rd − s
< 0 ⇔ s <
R− 2rd
R− 2
,
Thus, when s < (R − 2rd)/(R − 2) is satisfied, the condition γ˜(s) < γ holds and (dγ(s), s) is the
equilibrium.
By rewriting inequality 1 < γ˜(s), we have
1 < 2−
R(1− s)
rd − s
⇔
R− rd
R− 1
< s .
Thus, when (R−rd)/(R−1) < s is satisfied, the condition γ˜(s) < γ does not hold and (0, s¯), s¯ ∈ [s, 1]
is the equilibrium.
Then, we have the result of Proposition 1.
6.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose that there exists the new regulation τB ≥ τ and that τB(dγ(s), s) < τ holds.
When the bank chooses d = 0, its expected ROE is RB(0, s) = R/2 and its CAR is 1 with
∀s ∈ [s, 1]. Thus, it can choose any s in [s, 1] under the regulation. Moreover, its choice of s does
not affect its expected ROE, and thus ∀s ∈ [s, 1] is optimal with d = 0.
Suppose that the bank chooses d 6= 0. When s satisfies (R−2rd)/(R−2) ≤ s ≤ (R−rd)/(R−1),
R(d, s) can be either increasing or decreasing in d. With (dτ (s), s), the bank’s expected ROE
RB(dτ (s) =
1
2Rτ
[
R− (1− τ)
rd − s
1− s
]2
.
Then, because RB(0, s) = R/2 holds, the inequality RB(0, s) < RB(dτ (s), s) can be rewritten as
R
2
<
1
2Rτ
[
R− (1− τ)
rd − s
1− s
]2
⇔ R2(1− s)2τ <
[
R(1− s)− (1− τ)(rd − s)
]2
,
⇔ 0 < (1− τ)
{[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
]2
−(rd − s)
2τ
}
,
and then, the condition is summarized as
τ <
[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
rd − s
]2
≡ τ˜(s).
Then, when τ < τ˜(s) is holds, (dτ (s), s) is the equilibrium.
In addition, because the bank must satisfy the constraint d ≤ dγ(s), it cannot chooses dτ (s) when
dγ(s) < dτ (s) holds. We denote s such that equalizes dγ(s) to dτ (si) as si. Then, when si < s holds,
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the bank chooses d based on not dτ (s), but dγ(s). and thus the equilibrium is determined as it is in
proof of Proposition 1.
Moreover, by rewriting inequality 1 < τ˜(s), we have
(rd − s)
2 <
[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
]2
⇔ 0 < R(1− s)
[
R(1− s)− 2(rd − s)
]
.
Then, when s < (R−2rd)/(R−2) is satisfied, τ˜(s) is always larger than 1 and the condition τ < τ˜(s)
always holds. In other words, when s < (R− 2rd)/(R− 2) is satisfied, (dτ (s), s) is the equilibrium.
Then, we have the result of Proposition 2.
6.4 Proof of Lemma 2
By differentiating RB(dτ (s), s) by τ , we have
∂RB(dτ (s), s)
∂τ
=
1
2Rτ 2
[
R− (1− τ)
rd − s
1− s
] [
−R + (1 + τ)
rd − s
1− s
]
. (6.1)
Denote (rd − s)/(1 − s) as K(s). Then, equation (6.1) is quadratic function of K(s), and thus, we
have ∂RB(dτ (s), s)/∂τ > 0 with R/(1 + τ) < K(s) < R/(1 − τ), and ∂RB(dτ (s), s)/∂τ < 0 with
K(s) < R/(1 + τ), or R/(1 − τ) < K(s). The condition R/(1 + τ) < K(s) < R/(1 − τ) can be
rewritten as
R(1− s)
rd − s
− 1 < τ and 1−
R(1− s)
rd − s
< τ .
Thus, when ∂RB(dτ (s), s)/∂τ > 0 holds, τ must satisfies[
1−
R(1− s)
rd − s
]2
≡ τ˜(s) < τ 2 .
Then, we have the result of Lemma 2.
6.5 Proof of Corollary 1
Denote the bank’s choice of (d, s) when there exists no CAR regulation as (d∗, s∗), and the choice
under the the regulation τB ≥ τ , as (d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ ), respectively. In addition, suppose that (d
∗, s∗) =
(dγ(s), s) is satisfied; in other words, the bank uses both deposit and equity financing when there
exists no CAR regulation.
The first result is derived as follows. As it is described in Lemma 2, whenRB(dτ (s), s) is decreasing
in τ , τ satisfies τ˜(s) > τ 2. Then, when τ˜(s) > 1 holds, RB(dτ (s), s) is decreasing in τ with ∀τ ∈ [0, 1].
The condition τ˜(s) > 1 can be rewritten as
[
1−
R(1− s)
rd − s
]2
> 1 ⇔
[
2−
R(1− s)
rd − s
] [
−
R(1− s)
rd − s
]
> 0 .
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Because R(1− s)/(rd − s) is nonnegative with s ∈ [0, 1], the condition can be reduced as
2−
R(1− s)
rd − s
< 0 ⇔ s <
R− 2rd
R− 2
.
Thus, when s ≤ (R− 2rd)/(R− 2) is satisfied, τ˜(s) > τ
2 is satisfied with τ ∈ [0, 1).
Then, because (dγ(s), s) can be rewritten as (dτ (s), s) using some τ¯ , RB(d
∗, s∗) can be expressed
as a function of τ¯ . In addition, the assumption that the bank cannot choose (d∗, s∗) under the
regulation means that τ¯ > τ is satisfied. Then, when both s ≤ (R − 2rd)/(R − 2) and τ 6= 1 hold,
RB(d
∗, s∗) > RB(d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ ) is satisfied.
The second result is derived as follows. The bank’s investment amount with some (d, s) is ex-
pressed as
LB = G− sDB = G(1− sd) .
Then, because G is supposed to be fixed, the decrease of investment means increase of sd. In other
words, when the amount of the bank’s investment decreases after the regulation, sd must be satisfies
sdγ(s) < s
∗
τd
∗
τ .
Then, when d∗τ = 0 holds, it is clear that the condition sdγ(s) < s
∗
τd
∗
τ is not satisfied, and
thus the bank’s investment amount does not decrease. On the other hand, when d∗τ 6= 0 holds,
d∗τ = dτ (s) < dγ(s) and s
∗
τ = s = s
∗ are satisfied. Then, the condition sdγ(s) < s
∗
τd
∗
τ does not
satisfied and the bank’s investment amount does not decrease. Thus, there is no probability that the
bank decrease its investment to satisfy the regulation on its CAR.
Then, we have the results of Corollary 1.
6.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose that λH ≤ (R − 2)/2σE holds and point B exists as Figure 5. Then, with some fixed value
s, the households’ choice of d is dγ(s), dµ(s) or 0. Suppose that the households choose dµ(s). Then,
dµ(s) ≤ dγ(s) must hold under the constraint dH ≤ dγ(s). The inequality can be rewritten as
dµ(s) ≤ dγ(s) ⇔ 1−
(R− 1)s
2λHσ2E
≤
Rγ
(rd − s) +Rγ s
⇔
(rd − s)
[
2λHσ
2
E − (R− 1)s
]
R
[
2(1− s)λHσ2E + (R− 1)s
2
] ≡ γ¨(s) ≤ γ.
Denote Rγ¨(s)/
[
(rd − s) − Rγ¨(s)s ] as d¨γ(s). Then, when γ¨ = γ holds, we have dµ(s) = d¨γ(s) and
RB(dµ(s), s) can be expressed as RB(d¨γ(s), s). In other words, we can treat the point
(
dµ(s), s
)
as a
point on the line d = d¨γ(s). Then, because γ > γ˜(s) holds when RB(dγ(s), s) > RB(0, s) is satisfied,
γ¨(s) > γ˜(s) must hold when RB(d¨γ(s), s) > R/2 is satisfied.
Suppose that d 6= 0 is optimal for the bank. Taking the households’ decisions into account, the
optimal value of dH for the bank is min{dµ(s), dγ(s)}. When dµ(s) < dγ(s) holds, this inequality can
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be rewritten as γ¨(s) < γ. The supposition that d 6= 0 is optimal means that RB(d¨γ(s), s) > R/2 is
satisfied and γ¨(s) > γ˜(s) holds. Therefore, when γ˜(s) < γ¨(s) < γ holds, the equilibrium is (dµ(s), s);
contrariwise, when γ˜(s) < γ ≤ γ¨(s) holds, the equilibrium is (dγ(s), s). When min{γ, γ¨(s)} ≤ γ˜(s)
holds, the equilibrium is (0, sB).
Next, suppose that λH > (R−2)/2σE is satisfied and point C exists as Figure 6. Then, with some
s, the households’ possible choice of d is dγ(s), dµ(s) or dµ(1). As it is explained above, the bank’s
expected ROE with (dµ(s), s) can be rewritten as RB(d¨γ(s), s) using γ¨(s) and d¨γ(s).
Suppose that RB(dγ(s), s) < RB(dµ(1), 1) is satisfied. Then, because RB(dµ(1), 1) is equal to
RB(d¨γ(1), 1), the above equation can be rewritten as
(rd − s)(1− γ)
2
(rd − s)−Rγ(1− s)
< (1− γ¨(1))2 .
Denote (1− γ¨(1))2 as Γ, and then, the above equation can be rewritten as
γ2 +
R(1− s)Γ− 2(rd − s)
rd − s
γ + (1− Γ) < 0 . (6.2)
Denote the values of γ which equalize the both parts of inequality (6.2) as γ
1
and γ
2
(γ
1
≤ γ
2
),
respectively. When γ
1
and γ
2
exist as real solutions and γ
1
< γ
2
holds, the condition
[
R(1− s)Γ− 2(rd − s)
rd − s
]2
− 4(1− Γ) > 0
must be satisfied. The inequality can be rewritten as
Γ
(rd − s)2
[
R2(1− s)2Γ− 4R(1− s)(rd − s) + 4(rd − s)
]
> 0 ,
⇔ Γ >
4(rd − s)
[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
]
R2(1− s)2
. (6.3)
The right part of the inequality (6.3) is maximized with s = (R − 2rd)/(R − 2) and the value is 1.
Because Γ ≡ (1− γ¨(1))2 and γ¨(1) is less than 1, Γ ≤ 1 holds, and thus the inequality (6.3) cannot be
satisfied with some s. In other words, the two threshold values γ
1
, γ
2
does not always exist as real
solutions, and thus RB(dγ(s), s) > RB(dµ(1), 1) is satisfied with some s.
Then, when the inequality (6.3) is satisfied and γ
1
< γ < γ
2
holds, the bank’s expected ROE
satisfies RB(dγ(s), s) < RB(dµ(1), 1); contrariwise, when γ < γ1 or γ2 < γ holds or the inequality
(6.3) is not satisfied, RB(dγ(s), s) > RB(dµ(1), 1) is satisfied.
It is clear that the left part of the inequality (6.2) is positive with γ = 0. Then, by substituting
γ = 1, the value of the left part of inequality (6.2) is calculated as
1 +
R(1− s)Γ
rd − s
− 2 + (1− Γ) = Γ
[
R(1− s)
rd − s
− 1
]
.
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Suppose that the inequality (6.3) is satisfied. Then, when s > (R−rd)/(R−1) holds, the value in the
square brackets is negative and 0 < γ
1
< 1 < γ
2
is satisfied; contrariwise, when s ≤ (R− rd)/(R− 1)
holds and the inequality (6.3) is satisfied, the value is nonnegative and 0 < γ
1
< γ
2
≤ 1 is satisfied.
The choice of d is determined as follows. First, when γ¨(s) < γ is satisfied, dµ(s) < dγ(s) holds
and dµ(s) is chosen; contrariwise, when γ¨(s) ≥ γ is satisfied, dµ(s) ≥ dγ(s) holds and dµ(s) is chosen.
Next, when γ
1
< min{γ, γ¨(s)} < γ
2
is satisfied, RB(d¨γ(1), 1) is larger than the expected ROE with
the chosen d and d¨γ(1) is chosen; otherwise, the chosen d is the optimal choice. Because whether
γ
1
, γ
2
exist as real values or not depends partly on the value of s, we consider the following two
cases.
First, suppose that s ≤ (R − rd)/(R − 1) is satisfied. When the inequality (6.3) is not satisfied,
the equilibrium is determined based on the relationship between γ and γ¨(s). When γ¨(s) < γ is
satisfied, the equilibrium is
(
dµ(s), s
)
; otherwise the equilibrium is
(
dγ(s), s
)
. When the inequality
(6.3) is satisfied, 0 < γ
1
< γ
2
≤ 1 holds. Therefore, when γ ≤ γ¨(s) is satisfied and γ does not
satisfy γ
1
< γ < γ
2
the equilibrium is (dγ(s). When γ > γ¨(s) is satisfied and γ¨(s) does not satisfy
γ
1
< γ¨(s) < γ
2
, the equilibrium is (dµ(s), s). Then, when γ1 < min{γ, γ¨(s)} < γ2 is satisfied, the
equilibrium in (dµ(1), 1) .
Second, suppose that (R − rd)/(R − 1) < s is satisfied. In this case, 0 < γ1 < 1 < γ2 holds.
Therefore, when γ ≤ γ¨(s) and γ < γ
1
hold, the equilibrium is (dγ(s); contrariwise, when γ > γ¨(s)
and γ¨(s) < γ
1
hold, the equilibrium is (dµ(s), s). Then, when γ1 < min{γ, γ¨(s)} < γ2 holds, the
equilibrium in (dµ(1), 1).
Then, we have the results of proposition Proposition 3.
6.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Suppose that a new regulation τB ≥ τ is put into force and τB(dγ(s), s) < τ is satisfied.
Because the regulation does not affect the households’ decisions directly, when the reserve ratio
is s under the regulation, their choice of d is min{dµ(s), dγ(s)} as it is without the regulation. Then,
the bank adjusts the value of s to satisfy the constraint d ≤ dτ (s), and thus the points (d, s) that can
be chosen are (dµ(sµ), sµ); that is, the intersection point of d = dτ (s) and d = dµ(s), and (dγ(si), si);
that is, the intersection point of d = dτ (s) and d = dγ(s). In addition, (0, sB) and (dµ(1), 1) can be
chosen.
First, suppose that λH ≤ (R − 2)/2σE is satisfied and point B exists with sB ≤ 1. With some τ ,
the optimal value of d for the bank is dγ(si), dµ(sµ), or 0, and the former two s is expressed as dτ (si)
and dτ (sµ), respectively. Then, when RB(dτ (s), s) > RB(0, sB) is satisfied, the inequality[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
rd − s
]2
≡ τ˜(s) > τ
holds. Therefore, when τ˜(s) < τ is satisfied with s ∈ {si, sµ}, RB(dτ (s), s) < RB(0, sB) holds.
Because the households choose dH = dγ(s) only with s ∈ [s, sµ], when (dγ(si), si) can be chosen,
s ≤ si ≤ sj must be satisfied. Then, because dτ (s) is increasing in s, the intersection point of
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d = dµ(s) and d = dτ (s) exists on the upper right-hand part of (dγ(si), si). It implies that si < sµ
and dµ(sµ) > dγ(sµ) hold. Thus, the condition dH ≤ dγ(s) is not satisfied with (dµ(sµ), sµ) and it
cannot be the equilibrium. Then, when (dµ(sµ), sµ) can be chosen, sµ < si holds because dτ (s) is
increasing in s. It implies that s ≤ si ≤ sj is not satisfied and (dγ(si), si) cannot be the equilibrium.
In other words, when d 6= 0 and s 6= 1 hold at the equilibrium, the value of d and s depend on the
relationship between sµ and si, wheresi is defined as Definition 5, and sµ are calculated as
sµ ≡
(R− 2) + 2λHσ
2
E τ −
√
(R− 2 + 2λHσ2E τ)
2 − 8(R− 2)λHσ2E τ
2
2(R− 2)τ
.
Then, when both si ≤ sµ and τ < τ˜(si) hold, the equilibrium is (dγ(si), si); contrariwise, when
both si > sµ and τ < τ˜(sµ) hold, the equilibrium is (dµ(sµ), sµ). Then, when τ ≥ τ˜(s¯) is satisfied
with s¯ ≡ min{si, sµ}, the equilibrium is (0, sB).
Next, suppose that λH > (R − 2)/2σE is satisfied and point C exists with dµ(1) > 0. Then, with
some τ , the optimal value of d for the bank is dγ(si), dµ(sj), or dµ(1).
Suppose that RB(dτ (s), s) < RB(dµ(1), 1) is satisfied. Then, as it is described in proof of Propo-
sition 3, RB(dµ(1), 1) is equal to RB(d¨γ(1), 1), and thus the above equation can be rewritten as
1
2Rτ
[
R− (1− τ)
rd − s
1− s
]2
<
R
2
(1− γ¨(1))2 .
Denote (1− γ¨(1))2 as Γ. Then, the inequality can be rewritten as
(1− τ)2 +
R(1− s)
[
R(1− s)Γ− 2(rd − s)
]
(rd − s)2
(1− τ) +
R2(1− s)2(1− Γ)
(rd − s)2
< 0 . (6.4)
Denote the value of τ which equalize the both part of inequality (6.4) as τ 1(s) and τ 2(s) (τ 1(s) ≤
τ 2(s)), respectively. When τ 1(s) and τ 2(s) exist as real solutions and τ 1(s) < τ 2(s) holds, the
condition
R2(1− s)2
(rd − s)2
{[
R(1− s)Γ− 2(rd − s)
]2
− 4(1− Γ)(rd − s)
2
}
> 0 ,
⇔
R2(1− s)2
(rd − s)2
Γ
{
R2(1− s)2Γ− 4R(1− s)(rd − s) + 4(rd − s)
2
}
> 0 ,
⇔ Γ >
4(rd − s)
[
R(1− s)− (rd − s)
]
R2(1− s)2
(6.5)
must be satisfied. The inequality (6.5) is same as inequality (6.3) except the notation of s, and
thus, as it is described in proof of Proposition 3, with some s¯ such that s¯ = (R − 2rd)/(R − 2), the
inequality (6.5) cannot be satisfied. In other words, the threshold value τ 1(s¯) and τ 2(s¯) does not
always exist as real solutions. Thus, RB(dτ (s¯), s¯) > RB(dµ(1), 1) is satisfied with some s¯.
Then, with some s¯ ∈ [0, 1], when τ 1(s¯) < 1 − τ < τ 2(s¯) is satisfied, RB(dτ (s¯), s¯) < RB(dµ(1), 1)
hold. With τ = 1, the left part of the inequality (6.4) is nonnegative. By substituting τ = 0 into the
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left part, we have
1 +
R2(1− s)2
(rd − s)2
Γ−
2R(1− s)
(rd − s)
+
R2(1− s)2(1− Γ)
(rd − s)2
= 1−
2R(1− s)
(rd − s)
+
R2(1− s)2
(rd − s)2
,
=
[
1−
R(1− s)
rd − s
]2
≥ 0 .
Thus, when τ 1(s) and τ 2(s) exist as real solutions, 0 ≤ τ 1(s) ≤ τ 2(s) ≤ 1 is satisfied.
As it is described above, when d 6= 0 and s 6= 1 hold at the equilibrium, the value of d and s
depend on the relationship between sµ and si. First, suppose that the inequality (6.5) is satisfied.
Then, when si < sµ holds and τ does not satisfies τ 1(sµ) < τ < τ 2(sµ), the equilibrium is (dγ(si), si);
contrariwise, when si ≥ sµ holds and τ does not satisfies τ 1(si) < τ < τ 2(si), the equilibrium is
(dµ(sµ), sµ). When τ satisfies τ 1(s¯) < τ < τ 2(s¯) with s¯ ≡ min{si, sµ}, the equilibrium is (dµ(1), 1).
Second, suppose that the inequality (6.5) is not satisfied. Then, when si < sµ holds, the equilib-
rium is (dγ(si), si); contrariwise, when si ≥ sµ holds , the equilibrium is (dµ(sµ), sµ).
Then, we have the results of proposition Proposition 4.
6.8 Proof of corollary Corollary 2
Denote the bank’s choice of (d, s) without regulation and that under the regulation τB ≥ τ as (d
∗, s∗)
and (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ), respectively. In addition, suppose that the bank uses both deposit and equity financing
when the regulation does not exits and (d∗, s∗) = (dγ(s), s) holds.
The result of Corollary 2.1 is derived as follows. As it is described in proof of Corollary 1, when
s ≤ (R−2rd)/(R−2) is satisfied, τ˜(s) > τ
2 holds with τ ∈ [0, 1), and thusRB(dγ(s), s) > RB(dτ (s), s)
is satisfied. Then, with some s¯, RB(dγ(s), s) > RB(dτ (s¯), s¯) holds when RB(dτ (s), s) > RB(dτ (s¯), s¯)
is satisfied.
Suppose that s 6= 1 holds. Then, by differentiating RB(dτ (s), s) with s, we have
∂
∂s
{
1
2Rτ
[
R− (1− τ)
(
rd − s
1− s
)]2}
=
1
2Rτ
[
2(1− τ)2
(
rd − s
1− s
)
− 2R(1− τ)
]
rd − 1
(1− s)2
=
1− τ
Rτ
[
(1− τ)
(
rd − s
1− s
)
−R
]
rd − 1
(1− s)2
.
Thus, we have
∂RB(dτ (s), s)
∂s
< 0 ⇔ (1− τ)
(
rd − s
1− s
)
< R ,
⇔ s <
R− (1− τ)rd
R− (1− τ)
.
Therefore, when s < (R − rd)/(R − 1) holds, RB(dτ (s), s) is decreasing in s. In other words,
when s < s < (R − rd)/(R − 1) holds, RB(dτ (s), s) < RB(dτ (s), s) is satisfied. In addition, because
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(R−2rd)/(R−2) < (R−rd)/(R−1) holds, there exists some s that satisfies s < s < (R−rd)/(R−1)
when s ≤ (R− 2rd)/(R− 2).
In conclusion, when both s ≤ (R − 2rd)/(R − 2) and min{si, sµ} ≡ s¯ < (R − rd)/(R − 1) are
satisfied, the bank’s expected ROE satisfies RB(dγ(s), s) > RB(dτ (s¯), s¯); in other words, RB(d
∗, s∗) >
RB(d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ )
The result of Corollary 2.2 is derived as follows. As it is described in proof of Corollary 1, the
amount of the bank’s investment with some (d, s) is expressed as G(1− sd). Then, when the amount
of the bank’s investment decreases under the regulation, the choice (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ) satisfies sdγ(s) < s
∗
τd
∗
τ .
When d∗τ = 0 holds, it is clear that the above inequality is not satisfied. Then, suppose that
d∗τ 6= 0 holds. In addition, suppose that (d
∗
τ , s
∗
τ ) = (dγ(si), si) is satisfied. This supposition means
that si < sµ is satisfied and implies that the slope of line d = dµ(s) is sufficiently gentle; in other words,
λH is sufficiently large. Then, because si > s and dγ(si) > dγ(s) hold, the inequality sdγ(s) < s
∗
τd
∗
τ
is satisfied. Therefore, the amount of the bank’s investment decreases under the regulation.
Then, suppose that (d∗τ , s
∗
τ ) = (dµ(sµ), sµ) is satisfied. The inequality sdγ(s) < s
∗
τd
∗
τ can be
rewritten as
sdγ(s) <
[
1−
(
R− 2
2λHσ2E
)
sµ
]
sµ .
Then, the inequality is likely to be satisfied with some s, sµ when λH is sufficiently large and/or dγ(s)
is sufficiently small.
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